The Grid Is the New Oil: Michael Lewis (DWS) on Electrification, Critical Minerals & Energy Security

Episode Summary
Alan is joined by Michael Lewis, Head of ESG Research at DWS and a three-decade veteran of Deutsche Bank's FX, commodities, and sustainability research desks. Drawing on three DWS research papers co-authored with Stefan Kutscher (Head of Stewardship), Michael and Alan trace the energy transition from raw materials to the grid to the geopolitics reshaping it — arguing that "ESG" has effectively been repackaged as national security and financial stability. They dig into the structural copper deficit, why lithium keeps burning investors despite a strong long-term story, China's dominance over rare earths and refining, the US government's equity stake in MP Materials, grid and transformer bottlenecks with lead times stretching 2–5 years, the collision between data centres, EV charging, and renewables for scarce grid capacity, Ireland's outsized (and growing) data centre power burden, on-site generation and small modular reactors, the uranium investment case, and Germany's venture capital gap and industrial reinvention. Michael closes with his "most important thing": investors radically underestimate both recurring geopolitical shocks and physical climate risk to portfolios.

Guest Bio
Michael Lewis is Head of ESG Research at DWS, one of Europe's leading global asset managers. Over more than three decades at Deutsche Bank/DWS he has held roles including Global Head of Commodities Research and Deputy Head of FX Research. He now leads DWS's research into the major sustainability trends shaping the global economy — climate risk, biodiversity, and the energy transition. He holds economics degrees from the University of Bristol and the London School of Economics.

Papers referenced in this episode (co-authored with Stefan Kutscher, Head of Stewardship at DWS):

• The New Energy System: Navigating the Shift from Molecules to Electrons
• Germany's Next Industrial Revolution: Vorsprung durch Technik
• A third paper on European transformation and critical technologies (referenced but not individually titled in conversation)

Timestamps

• 03:48 — Welcome and guest introduction
• 04:20 — Michael's career arc: FX (birth of the Euro) → commodities supercycle → ESG/sustainability, and why sustainability is the most complex of the three
• 06:01 — Is "ESG" being reframed as national security and financial stability?
• 09:36 — The three mega forces (geopolitical fragmentation, energy transition, AI/tech disruption) and how bottlenecks show up in valuations
• 12:45 — Copper: only 14 new deposits discovered since 2016 vs. 225 since 2003 — is the structural deficit now baked in?
• 15:37 — Lithium's boom-bust cycles: how investors "burnt twice" should size exposure (diversified equity vs. spot)
• 18:57 — China's grip: 70% of lithium/cobalt, 90%+ of rare earths — and the new geopolitical bargaining chip
• 21:34 — Inside the US DoD–MP Materials deal: equity stakes, price floors, and emerging two-tier commodity pricing
• 24:03 — Where the real bottleneck sits: transmission and distribution, not power generation
• 26:38 — The "great power infrastructure competition" — data centres, EV charging, and renewables all fighting for the same grid capacity
• 29:26 — Why renewable projects are the most exposed: cheap to build, stuck in multi-year interconnection queues
• 31:10 — Ireland's data centre power problem: from ~5% of metered electricity in 2015 to a projected ~33% by 2030
• 35:00 — Ireland's high electricity prices and the puzzle of muted public pushback
• 36:01 — On-site generation and SMRs: Microsoft's Three Mile Island restart, Google's small modular reactor deal, and the hybrid grid model
• 38:05 — The uranium and nuclear investment case as clean baseload — and why it's a genuinely hard market to play
• 40:53 — Germany's venture capital gap (~0.2% of GDP) and the "unicorn exodus"
• 45:39 — Where capital is actually flowing in Germany: defence VC up roughly 10x, plus clean tech and AI hubs
• 47:35 — Top-down portfolio theme: why "electrification" beats picking individual commodities or names
• 50:57 — The Most Important Thing: recurring geopolitical shocks and underestimated physical climate risk to portfolios
• 53:53 — Where to find Michael Lewis (DWS website, LinkedIn)

Key Takeaways

• ESG has been quietly rebranded as security policy. Climate and nature risk are increasingly framed as national security, energy security, and financial stability issues — accelerated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the EU's new electrification action plan.
• The bottleneck has moved downstream. The hard part is no longer generating renewable power — it's moving and connecting it. Transformer and high-voltage cable lead times now run 2–5 years, and grid investment needs to roughly double to around $600bn annually by 2030.
• Copper's deficit looks structural, not cyclical, given collapsing discovery rates and long mine-development timelines — but industrial metals (unlike agriculture) can't quickly flex supply in response to price.
• Lithium and cobalt remain genuinely volatile small markets ("today's god is tomorrow's dog") — Michael favours diversified equity exposure to quality, low-cost producers over trying to time spot prices.
• China's dominance in rare earths (~90% of refining) and lithium/cobalt (~70%) is a multi-decade head start that new Western policy (EU Critical Raw Materials Act, US Section 45X) will not close quickly.
• Governments are now pricing strategic value, not just supply and demand. The US government's equity stake in MP Materials and an implied price floor point to emerging two-tier, region-specific commodity pricing.
• Data centres, EV charging, and renewables are all competing for the same scarce grid capacity, forcing large users toward hybrid models — grid connection plus on-site generation, storage, or deals like Microsoft's 20-year Chevron power purchase agreement.
• Ireland is a live case study: data centres were ~5% of metered electricity in 2015, are already over 20%, and are projected toward a third of national demand by 2030 — among the highest shares globally.
• Uranium/nuclear is an important but genuinely difficult investment theme — long project timelines, high development risk, but growing policy support as baseload complement to intermittent renewables.
• Germany's venture capital base (~0.2% of GDP) lags the US and UK sharply, but defence VC has grown roughly tenfold in a few years as Europe pushes rearmament, fiscal reset, and a "Mittelstand" reinvention.
• The top-down portfolio theme Michael favours is electrification — broader and more diversified than any single commodity or company, spanning transport, data, buildings, and industry.
• His "most important thing": investors underweight both recurring (not one-off) geopolitical shocks and physical climate risk — the latter still poorly integrated into portfolio and supply-chain risk models since DWS's own 2017 research on this.

Notable Quotes

"This national security, energy security is coming through in a sort of a decarbonisation way... everything really seems to be working in favor of a much faster transition now than say five years ago." — Michael Lewis

"It always reminds me of this old commodity adage which was this year's winner is next year's loser. Today's god is tomorrow's dog." — Michael Lewis, on lithium/cobalt volatility

"Silver has a habit of making millionaires out of billionaires. So this is not for the faint-hearted, these markets." — Michael Lewis

"We've become great at manufacturing solar panels and batteries. The challenge is really getting that electricity from where it's generated to actually where it's needed." — Michael Lewis

"The grid infrastructure now is just more important than the generation economics." — Michael Lewis

"The most important thing is... understanding the vulnerability from an investment perspective of geopolitical risk, because people just think it's one-offs — but these are not one-offs, they're happening every single year, if not twice or three times a year." — Michael Lewis

Resources & Links Mentioned

• DWS research: The New Energy System: Navigating the Shift from Molecules to Electrons
• DWS research: Germany's Next Industrial Revolution: Vorsprung durch Technik
• EU Critical Raw Materials Act
• US Section 45X (critical minerals production incentive)
• Microsoft–Chevron 20-year power purchase agreement; Microsoft's Three Mile Island restart deal; Google's small modular reactor deal
• Documentary reference: Meltdown: Three Mile Island (Netflix)
• Related episodes referenced: Jeff Currie (formerly Goldman Sachs) on copper; Louis-Vincent Gave; Justin Huhn (Uranium Insider)

Guest Contact

• Michael Lewis is active on LinkedIn and via the DWS website 

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:00

We would so I would say electrification i is kind of a a big investment theme for us. Um I think it kind of captures quite a large part of you know quite a large part of, you know, we've got transport in there, we've got digital and data centers, we've got buildings as well, and and and the industrial sector which is electrifying. So I think it does capture quite a broad range of all sectors in the economy.

SPEAKER_01 0:29

The energy transition is no longer just a climate story. It's becoming a national security, supply chain, and infrastructure race. And some of the biggest opportunities and risks are emerging in places most investors aren't looking. As the global economy shifts from molecules to electrons, demand for power is surging. But the infrastructure needed to support that shift isn't keeping pace. Copper is getting tighter, grid connections are harder to secure, some critical cables and equipment can take years to procure, and China's dominance of critical mineral processing has turned what was once an industrial issue into a geopolitical one. So where are the real bottlenecks? Where is capital going to have to flow? And who stands to benefit? To answer those questions, I'm joined by Michael Lewis, head of ESG Research at DWS, one of Europe's largest asset managers. Michael brings more than three decades of experience in financial markets, spanning foreign exchange, commodities, and sustainability research. Over that career he's had a front row seat to some of the biggest structural shifts in markets. And today his focus is increasingly on the intersection of electrification, energy security, critical materials and industrial policy. In this conversation, we look beyond solar panels and wind turbines to the physical reality of the energy transition copper, cables, transformers, grids, data centers, and the critical minerals required to make electrification actually work. We discussed why Michael believes copper could remain structurally tight for the next decade, why lithium is a much more complicated investment story, how China builds such a powerful position in critical minerals, and why governments in the US and Europe are becoming increasingly willing to intervene in strategic supply chains. We also explore the extraordinary competition for electricity created by AI and data centers, the renewed interest in nuclear power, and what all of this means for Europe's industrial competitiveness. Because the defining question is no longer simply how quickly can we transition to cleaner energy. It's whether we have the materials, the infrastructure and power systems required to do it. Here's my conversation with Michael Lewis of DWS. Okay, so I'm absolutely delighted to say that joining me now is Michael Lewis. Michael is the head of ESG Research at DWS, one of Europe's leading global asset managers. Michael has spent more than three decades at the forefront of financial markets and investment research with previous roles, including global head of commodities research and deputy head of FX Research at Deutsche Bank. Today he leads DWS's work on the major sustainability trends shaping the global economy, from climate risk and biodiversity to the energy transition, helping investors understand how these forces are reshaping markets. He holds degrees in economics from the University of Bristol and the London School of Economics. Michael, you're very welcome to the podcast. How are you? I'm very well. Thank you very much for the introduction. Yeah, this is part of our energy series, Michael, and again, hugely topical in terms of you know all the geopolitical uh instability that we see, the climate change, energy, and transition team that's been dominant for a number of years. But before we get into those important issues, I think it'd be good for listeners just to get a sense of your own background and how I suppose you ended up at a senior position uh in this area with Deutsche.

SPEAKER_00 4:20

Yeah, well, I'm one of those unusual people that left the LSC as a postgrad and I stayed at the same company for three decades. Um, but I guess what's interesting for me is I sort of bounced from one mega trend in a sense to another. Um so I, as you were mentioning, foreign exchange research, that was the birth of the Euro in 1999 with all the lead up and the sort of the consequences following that. And then in 2003 moved into commodities and the start of the super cycle, the hot commodity boom. Um back in those days, oil was $20 and gold was $250. So we've moved a long way since then. And I suppose the unusual transition, having been in the world of commodities and the what many cause the that has created this issue of physical climate risk and the need for the energy transition, is then to bounce into sustainability and trying to understand it. And I have to say, of all the FX commodities and sustainability, sustainability for me is the most complicated. Commodities were easy in a sense because they had such a strong financial correlation to equity risk premium, to the dollar, to nominal interest rates, real interest rates. So you really had a very strong anchor to understand what were driving commodities alongside the physical supply-demand fundamentals. But I think with ESG and sustainability, you not only have the dimensions of technology and economics, but you've got policy governments, and obviously you've got quite a lot of activism around this space. So it's a much more complex sector, it's a much more longer-term sector. Um, but I think what's interesting for me is how we've moved the ESG world has maybe moved into a more solid environment, not so reliant on subsidies, and actually technology is quite exciting in this space now.

SPEAKER_01 6:01

Yeah, and the basis of for our discussion today, I suppose, is three research papers that you've produced uh with your co-author uh Stefan Kutcher. I hope I haven't uh butchered Stefan's name. Uh Stefan is the head of uh stewardship standards and processes. Uh but I have these papers here, really fascinating. And with your with your with your permission, I'll I'll I'll share those also. But we we we traverse in those papers you traverse energy, uh new energy system navigating the shift from molecules to electrons. Another title focuses on Germany's uh next industrial revolution, Varsprung Dirk Technic. Um but just to start out our conversation, you mentioned ESG there. Would it be fair to say that there's been a reframing, I suppose, of uh environmental, social governance towards more national security, financial stability, and perhaps that is that an easier in inverted comers repackaging of ESG?

SPEAKER_00 7:01

Yes, I think that that is absolutely what's happened. I think we've looked at um many years the climate and nature uh risks through an ESG lens, but now we're increasingly recognizing that this has become a national security, energy security, and really financial stability issues. And actually, to be fair, Mark Carney, now the Prime Minister of Canada, he did mention this back in 2015. It's just taken us a long time to realize those risks. And I guess what we've seen over the last few days is the European Commission has been announcing its own electrification target. And it's quite a good example, actually, of how Europe's energy policy is evolving. Rather than treating electrification as an indirect outcome of climate, renewable energy and efficiency policies, the Commission is now making it an explicit policy objective. And really, this reflects how Europe has been so exposed to the energy shocks that we've seen over the last few years. You know, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the gas dependency was exposed very vividly in 2022, and now the closure of the Straits of Hormuz. And we're sort of seeing this dependency, not just in Europe. I mean, this is a global story of Asia's dependencies, the structural vulnerabilities. I mean, just in terms of European Union, 50% of the region's energy consumption is coming from imported fossil fuels, and it's adding a huge import bill to Europe. And so I think the electrification action plan is quite a good example of how we're seeing a route to lower these exposures to volatile fossil fuel markets. So this national security, energy security is coming through in a sort of a decarbonisation way. Um, and so this is also uh I I guess we're sort of seeing that investors are looking much more at the lens of resilience. Uh, they're looking at the the resource scarcity and and and uh dependencies that there are, and really trying to strengthen supply chain durability. And COVID was a good example of that. And so I guess what we're seeing is just energy shops are driving a much more powerful agenda. And I think, you know, the climate, to some degree, people are looking at forecasts for 2030, 2040, 2050 in terms of net zero. Um, it's hard to get your head around that in terms of policy to drive things, you know, electoral cycles are only four or five years long. But when you've got national energy security, you there's a much greater momentum here and power that everything really seems to be working in favour of a much faster transition now than say five years ago.

SPEAKER_01 9:36

A common theme uh reading the papers was this notion of bottlenecks. And, you know, uh looking at the three mega forces that you've you've covered, you know, geopolitical fragmentation is one, the energy transition two, and then perhaps rapid technical disruption, DAI uh revolution, I I suppose. But markets, you could argue, have expressed those teams uh in different ways. I mean we've seen with I won't mention individual equity names, but a particular German stock uh uh basically went vertical, uh which you mentioned in your paper, and we we know uh uh what what has happened with the Magnificent 7 and so forth. But I suppose my question is, how how do we think about these bottlenecks with respect to valuations, you know, you know, in terms of the grid supply chain infrastructure? How how do you differentiate there in terms of what's priced in, what's not?

SPEAKER_00 10:35

So I guess we've spent a lot of time in the ESG and sustainability world looking at renewable power generation, and that's captured, you know, we all know about the solar in the wind, we get all the headlines on that. But I think with that discussion has kind of moved on a bit, and we've become, you know, we're great at manufacturing solar panels and batteries. The challenge is really getting that electricity from where it's generated to actually where it's needed. And so that's why we often describe this transition as moving away from a power generation story very much to an infrastructure story. And so we speak about the sort of the supply supply constraints and bottlenecks around certain critical materials. Um, so that's really, you know, that's way up and upstream looking at the bottlenecks that exist as well in the equipment manufacturing and construction and installation sector. So that's a little bit further down the value chain. So that's just kind of like the making of turbines, generators, transformers, high voltage cables. So huge underinvestment that's gone on um in the production of transformers and cables, for example. And so this is another sort of a supply constraint. So we've sort of see backlogs here with lead times for cables and transformers ranging from two to five years. So uh, and then you know, we kind of move forward, we go into the the the power generation, the actual transmission and distribution of that, the grids, you mean huge amounts of underinvestment in that infrastructure as well. So you can kind of see all along the value chain, there's a you know, from the from the miners at the beginning to the construction to the manufacturing equipment to the transmission and uh and distribution, there's all this enormous amount of investment that's needed. So you you the numbers are pretty enormous in terms of we need grid investment really needs to double uh by 2030 to sort of $600 billion uh annually. Um and uh and that's really after quite a long period of sort of stagnation. Um and so this is it's revealing that you know just a lot of bottlenecks all along the chain. And I think this is why we're seeing more and more investment products trying to sort of capture that investment opportunity.

SPEAKER_01 12:45

Yeah, it was very interesting to me, even looking at the the start of that kind of chain, which is the minerals and uh these critical minerals. And I know Jeff Curry, uh former Goldman Sachs, has talked a lot about copper in the concept in terms of its huge supply deficit there. Um and I an interesting piece of the research from your paper was there was 14 new copper deposits uh since 2016, whereas uh up previously from uh since 2003 we had 225 uh new copper deposits. So I suppose if we talk specifically about copper, I mean you could argue that the structural deficit is just baked in now at this stage. Would that be would that be reasonable?

SPEAKER_00 13:35

Yes, I mean I think it is. I mean, what's I think why people focus on copper is that it just really is at the center of of particularly electrification because it's embedded in grids, renewables, electric vehicles, data centers, and industrial electrification. So uh and all and as well the fact that it is an exchange-traded commodity, it's very liquid, you can get exposure, it's much easier than some of these rare earths, which are a bit niche. Um, I guess what's sort of interesting, although copper's kind of there's a big demand story, you know, there's more EVs, there's more kind of grids and all this sort of stuff, a lot of it, as you were saying, is very much it's a supply issue. You know, it's the mine development timelines are just so incredibly long, as and the copper ore grades are declining, uh, you know, fewer copper deposits are being discovered. I mean, this story actually isn't new. I mean, I was doing this in in the commodity days at Deutsche Bank. So it but it's just that it's just such a long investment cycle. Um, and so this cannot really, you know, it can't be solved overnight. Um and I guess what we're seeing is this this structural deficit will be a feature of this market probably for the next decade. And so with with that comes the obviously volatility. We will get um probably a sustained premium um for certain producers with high quality assets as it relates to copper. Uh, I guess you know, industrial metals they're a little bit different to the sort of the other commodities like agriculture. We see a lot of focus on El Nino and the sort of the strengthening and already heating climate and inventory to consumption ratios in agriculture very low across softs and coffee and cocoa and rice and all these sort of commodities. Um, but with agriculture, supplies can kind of respond quite quickly, and that's not really something that's a feature within the industrial metals and particularly the copper space. So I think this structural deficit, there are a few forecast discrepancies across when those deficits are going to appear, um, but it does look like this will be a very tight market for quite some time.

SPEAKER_01 15:37

Yeah, I pulled up a copper chart before the interview, just to have a have a look at it. And whilst yes, there's been a significant volatility, I mean, the trend has been only one way really. Um, but then you look at something like lithium and you look at it from the perspective of an investor, I suppose, and you know, we had that huge run-up pre-uh the pandemic, and then we had, you know, massive decline. So, I mean, what's what's what's the view of lithium in the context of investors being fairly uh burnt in twice in the last decade with severe volatility? I mean, I suppose how do you how does an investor balance? Yes, we can make all these structural arguments, but the in the inherent volatility of the underlying is is significant.

SPEAKER_00 16:24

Well, people get excited about lithium and cobalt and these and they're very small uh markets in in the grand scheme of things. So it makes for a really great long-term investment theme. But as you say, there's this inherent volatility in commodity cycles. And and you know, this volatility is nothing new for investors, but it always reminds me of this old commodity adage, which was this year's winner is next year's loser. Today's God is tomorrow's dog. And this is a natural feature of a lot of mean reverting commodities. I guess there is, you know, a bit like copper, there is a bit of a diversion, dispersion of use with lithium in terms of its deficit, but people will naturally be get quite excited. Um, you know, and some of these are export controls that, you know, sometimes we get shocks to these markets. Um, and you know, there's another adage which is which was um when I was in commodities, it was um silver has a habit of making millionaires out of billionaires. So this is not for the faint-hearted these markets. And so there's a and as I was saying, these are non-exchange traded commodities. I think with lithium, actually, this has changed recently. China now has listed it in one of its exchanges, but still the access to this market via futures is historically a little bit more challenging. And so it I think maybe try, you know, it maybe rather than trying to time the lithium price perfectly, you know, maybe investors should just be looking, you know, looking at equity exposure. So there's a maybe a little bit of diversification there, quality operators, low cost, always useful to look at cost curves of companies, look at the low-cost producers, and then sort of get that get that exposure. Um, I think when it I mean, for DWS, um naturally we have sort of investment products in this area, and what we're doing is just looking at a broad range of critical material producers. So you're not just looking at one particular lithium producer. So perhaps that diversification is one way to be a little bit more um prudent in terms of the exposure if you want to capture that sort of critical mini or if you want to play that um climate transition commodity story. Um, because I think that that so, in a way, I think what we want to avoid is kind of moving into the Wild West and using much more of a diversification strategy within that. But as you say, these markets can go up very. I mean, I think it was 100% one year and it fell 100%, or health fell sort of 50 or 70% the next year. So these swings are an inherent nature of commodities, and we can't get around that.

SPEAKER_01 18:57

You mentioned China, Michael, and I suppose this leads nicely then into the perhaps the more geopolitical aspects of all this. You look at China having 70% of the world's lithium cobalt and 90% of rare earths, and we see all the policy responses in the US and in Europe with the Critical Minerals Act and US section 45X. I mean, how do you think about that lobsidedness, if you want for want of a better word, in relation to the resources? And we all are aware of uh Trump's uh approach with uh Zelensky at that famous meeting. You know, I had Louis Vincent Gav on on the the podcast a number of months ago, and he basically said, uh, what what do you got for me? You know, you want you want defence, we want your rare earths. There's no kind of hiding behind it now, it's very upfront. And I suppose that is a function of of that mismatch in terms of resources, obviously.

SPEAKER_00 19:59

Yeah, I mean the dominance of China is enormous, particularly within the refining space of these of these rare earths. Uh and you know, this dominance has just been built over decades. You know, industrial policy, technological learning, you know, we've got you know, in certain critical minerals, China is controlling over 70% of the refining capacity, you know, and 90% in some of these rare earth supply chains. So the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, the US incentives, I mean, they're meaningful. They're trying to improve that supply chain diversification. You know, you've got the Greenland story, that was another one that popped up. Um, but you know, I would say this is just the start of a process. I think we've just revealed um our vulnerabilities from a supply chain chain perspective. Uh you see you, and obviously, you know, we've seen export controls that China have put in on certain materials, and this is what's triggered this reaction. So, you know, building mines, getting access to materials, this takes years. China's just got an enormous head start. Um, and so it just sustains that geopolitical geopolitical risk premium in markets as it relates to commodities. So it's just, I think probably what it is is it is it's not these things are not going to change. You know, China's dependency is uh is dominance is there. I think it just maybe does present a barrier to the speed of the energy transition, the access to these materials. Uh, and you know, trade policy will just continue to be pretty fraught, I would say, through, you know, with the US, how it plays, how it's playing its kind of cards, it's using that trade tool quite aggressively.

SPEAKER_01 21:34

I suppose something that was really interesting to me in looking at one of the papers was how the US Department of Defense uh was involved with MP materials in terms of that public-private partnership and introducing a tenure price floor. Can you can you speak to that in terms of how that worked and and what was the motive behind that? And I because I think that really. Emphasizes perhaps how far China are ahead.

SPEAKER_00 22:04

Yeah, so that that array that MP materials arrangement was is kind of just another example of how governments have become much more interventionist. I mean, this is a feature. I mean, I think maybe I can speak for you as well, Alan. When we were growing up, it was all about free markets. Governments are a bad thing. Now the world has changed into a much more interventionist. So the US government now is taking an equity stake in the country's main rare earth producer. You know, it's not nationalization, but I mean it's got a little bit of a sniff about that. Uh, you know, and it comes into response to China's implementation of export controls. Um, and so what we're getting now is sort of slightly divergent sort of market prices by region. You know, in the case of China, it's slightly lower prices, and everywhere else it's a bit higher. And so we're sort of getting this kind of two pricing tier, two-tier pricing kind of thing. So I guess it's interesting because it does, it this deal just exposes the supply security um issue, uh, and that this has become so it's not just solely supply-demand cost curves that are driving prices. We've got an an additional, um, it's not just market price and fundamentals. We've got governments now assigning strategic value to domestic production. Uh, and so in a way, it does create this sort of slightly parallel pricing structure that might appear. So, and I guess so. For investors, for us, it's kind of sort of saying there we're we're now looking at two sources of value. Um, we've not just got the commodity exposure, but we're also looking at the supply, the security of supply exposure. So I think these are slightly changing how we look at different commodities, which we wouldn't have done 10 or 20 years ago. So, in a way, sort of the geography, the jurisdiction is important, what the permitting or the production certainty is, or the policy support, all of these things now becoming much more important uh in terms of sort of valuing companies and and sort of certain assets.

SPEAKER_01 24:02

Very interesting. If we if we move to the grids and the equipment then, um and and looking at at a high level, I suppose the biggest bottleneck not so wasn't so much in making electricity, it's it's moving it and connecting it and the infrastructure associated there. In relation to that segment or part of the value chain, where are the biggest bottlenecks there, Michael?

SPEAKER_00 24:28

Well, I sort of maybe meant a little bit of, I mean, we sort of we sort of have kind of five pillars that we kind of look at. We look at the the sort of the the mining and processing refining at the beginning, and then we go into the manufacturing equipment, the construction and installation, the turbines and all of that. And then we've got the clean, the the power generation itself, the solar and the wind, and then we've got the transmission and the grids. I think you know all of them have got their issues. Um I think we were trying to sort of highlight sort of big areas. Well, they're they're they're kind of everywhere along that chain. Uh I think what is probably the most complex is the transmission and distribution, and and that's where you need to see much uh much stronger sort of policy frameworks. So Europe has set up, has embarked on quite an aggressive program here in terms of energy highways, grids, sort of European grids packages, really trying to sort of unlock, uh trying to sort of it accelerate permitting. Uh so uh for me, I would say the transmission and disillusion is probably the most critical. We've got all clean power and generation, and that is just trying to connect it to the grid, so that's pretty important. But as I say, that physically you can really see it in the construction ins and construction installation as well as the manufacturing equipment, those the cables, all these lot the two to year, two to five year lead times, uh, sort of backlogs. So it's pretty much everywhere, I would say. Um and uh and I think that's kind of appealing for sort of investors because they can look at all the different range. They're all in a way playing the energy transition, playing electrification, but each of them have very different risk return profiles. So it's a very diversified space. So as I say, there are obviously investment products that c capture the critical mineral producers, but they're obviously uh infrastructure investments as well, and that's probably the one of the biggest asset classes to kind of play this story, and you can do that through actual physical infrastructure assets, or you can do that through sort of listed equity. So I think I think the the kind of the bottlenecks are sort of everywhere, is the kind of the answer.

SPEAKER_01 26:37

Yeah, and I I it kind of jumped out to me that this was this great power infrastructure competition. So we have, you know, you mentioned the transit transformer lead times two years, the high voltage cable orders five years. But then in the midst of all this, we have the the EV charging build-out data centers, renewable connections. So everybody's competing for the same infrastructure. How how does this play out? I mean, uh and I I know that uh we'll get to data centers and uh the hyperscalers looking at getting their own uh resource on site through small modular reactors or gas insulation. But uh how does that play out in your view? Uh does money talk in this regard?

SPEAKER_00 27:23

Yes, so you're right. Everybody's competing for the same infrastructure. So some are gonna win, some are gonna lose, and everybody's trying to fight their way through. I think the data centers are just really interesting because they have kind of not appeared out of nowhere, but it's these are really big changing quite a lot of the electricity demand profile, particularly obviously in the United States. Um, and they obviously have quite a lot of financial firepower to secure their own solutions for on-site generation, storage, you know, or premium grid arrangements. So these entities are really trying to bypass this constraint. So we've had a few examples of this already when we've got Microsoft's 20-year power purchase agreement with Chevron. Um, I mean, in certain other parts of the world, you know, we've had slightly we've had moratoriums on the permitting and building a data center. So that was something in the Netherlands. Um we've also seen this a little bit in Ireland a few years ago, just in terms of power. And I think actually, you know, you'll know this better than me, but just the power requirements of data centers in Ireland as a share of total energy's guns. I think it's probably the highest in the world. There might be a few places, but it's pretty high. So you kind of see there are two approaches kind of appearing. We've got, you know, we've got the US approach, which tries to sort of bypass the thing, source your independent power, um, you know, bring your own power station. It's probably been a bit more of a rationing story. Um, I guess though, these I think for me though, in terms of widespread impact, I'd still say renewable projects are probably the m sort of the most vulnerable in terms of we've got huge amounts of capacity, but actually what's actually um utilized is a lot lower. So these are off, you know, these are so dependent on grid interconnection, um, and we've seen thousands of sort of gigawatts in connection cues globally. So in many regions I would say renewable resources kind of exist, but it's just the connection does not. So I think that's probably the part that is kind of not working as efficiently as it should do.

SPEAKER_01 29:26

Yeah, it it's it's a really interesting point because what you could assume then is that there's been this huge focus on uh the renewable side of things and generating and making all that more efficient, but less focus on the actual connective tissue or the infrastructure itself. And perhaps playing that team might be uh a way uh to look at to look at things. Uh any additional comments on that?

SPEAKER_00 29:56

Yeah, I mean, absolutely. I mean, so many regions, renewable generation is just the cheapest form of new electricity spy. So you're just thinking, right, this is my opportunity. But the as I say, the challenge is just connecting these projects, reinforcing the networks as well. And um, so you know, we've got huge wait times. Um, so I think it's you know, the grid infrastructure now is just more important than the generation economics because we should just look pretty good. Um, and so that's what sort of mentioning earlier, we now are seeing more and more these policy frameworks being introduced, you know, such as the EU grids package, to try and unlock these barriers to this type of infrastructure investment. Um, so as I say, this is this this this package is trying to accelerate permitting, you know, the establishment of new generation of eight strategic energy highways that kind of crisscross across the continent. Um, so that electrification action plan, which came out last week, I think is is big trying to sort of help um connect that and sort of solve you know the the it's trying to it's trying to monetize the success of power generation that we've seen over the last few years.

SPEAKER_01 31:09

You you mentioned uh Ireland uh and and data centers, Michael, and uh a really stunning statistic for me was that you know ten ye just ten years ago, 2015, data centres accounted for just five percent of our total uh metered elect electricity uh consumption. Whereas, you know, as you said, Ireland's projected to be the highest in the world in terms of share of national power demand uh by by 2030, and we are way up there at the moment. So I I suppose the risk for for Ireland the risk for Ireland Inc. I suppose is that um from investors looking in is is is there a crowding out as such of the of the energy grid and electrical grid in relation to data centers? And that's very topical in Ireland at the moment, obviously.

SPEAKER_00 32:04

Yeah, I mean I I think I think actually, well, and the chart I've seen is Ireland is actually at the top. I mean it it's I I thought I thought it was about 18%. Then I saw a new figure that it was actually over 20% now, and it's gonna go to a third by 2030. So we're all well that so you know it's quite a it's quite a bullish sort of story. Um it sort of reminds me, um, you know, we've got these sort of issues in the United States. Virginia, for example, has really high data center power um requirements as a share of its state power. And we're sort of seeing the migration of data centers, you know, these things, they they can c they can be built quite quickly and they can migrate. And I think the the Great Lakes, where there's a huge amount of water, is a little bit cooler up there. These areas are sort of are uh where there are overcapacity and we are seeing up that migration to new locations. And I think the Nordics have sort of become kind of like the poster child for the digital economy, but also for data centers in a way that power is very cheap, you know, it's all renewables, it's hydro, nuclear, whatever, and they've got a huge amount of water. So we do countries do need to be a little bit careful of, you know, and uh the one thing that I think is interesting in Ireland is that I don't think we've seen you you can correct me if they're probably one on this, you're closer to than me, but in the United States, the public opposition now to data centres is enormous. Um, the impact that residents are feeling on their own power prices because a data center is close by, you know, that th that connection has been made very quickly in the United States. I don't think the public opinion in Ireland is so negative on a data center. Um, but I think what we are sort of seeing is that, you know, having I think my sense was in Ireland that there were moratoriums a bit like Netherlands, but now we're looking at um uh data centres over a certain size have to provide their own um uh their own generation. So there are solutions, there are things that Island Inc. is look I think, you know, at the end of the day, and it it does, it it is an investment opportunity, that bottleneck. Um but uh I think maybe maybe the thing to watch out for is just public opinion because I think obviously electricity prices typically are very expensive in Europe, particularly when you compare the United States. And when we look at the electrification and plan that Europe has just announced, European Commission has just announced, they really do want to look at electricity prices relative to gas prices, relative to fossil fuel prices. They really want to bring that ratio down. They don't want electricity to be so expensive, they want it to be that fuel of choice for the heat pumps, for you know, for all of these electrification technologies. So data centers do put a spanner in the works when it comes to that. Um, but it does look like you know Ireland is moving away from a European model of rationing to a more of a US model of bringing in that power generation if you want if you want to construct, you need your own kind of um power generation source. That so that might help if that works.

SPEAKER_01 35:00

Yeah, I mean Europe has one of the highest prices in electricity prices in the world, but Ireland has some of the highest electricity prices in in Europe, so I am a bit surprised that there hasn't been more pushback. Um the cynic in me might uh suggest that our over reliance on a certain uh foreign national uh and a certain sectors might uh have something to do with that. We are our tax base is very concentrated, and that's no secret. Um, but maybe that's for another day. In terms of the on-site generation, then Michael, I mean, looking at the options there for if we talk about the hyperscalers, I know Microsoft, for example, has looked has uh published a lot of work on small modular reactors uh to bypass the grid, the inter interconnection cues essentially. Um is this just a stopgap measure or I mean how feasible do you think this is?

SPEAKER_00 36:01

Well, I think what's gonna happen, you're gonna get you were moving to a sort of a hybrid model. I mean, electricity networks do remain the backbone, but I think large, large, some large users, like data centers, want to supplement that grid connection with their own dedicated generation and storage. So I think we're we're getting kind of this dual kind of approach here. I mean, one of the kind of the really weird things in a way is that the technology companies a few years ago were kind of the poster child for greenhouse gas emission reductions. They had these really aggressive net zero targets, they were meeting them, you know, it was all looking really good. And now the data centers appeared, and all their greenhouse gas emissions are now going in the completely the opposite direction. And so it's that challenge is trying to reverse this greenhouse gas emission sort of spike that we've seen with the big sort of tech companies. Uh, and so not surprisingly, the tech companies really do want to be using those clean power generating sources to sort of reverse this this their their kind of or at least have a chance of meeting these quite aggressive net zero targets. So we've kind of seen that with Microsoft, with the that's three m Three Mile Island restart, Google's small modular reaction deal. Uh, you know, all of this is part of these companies really trying to stick with the 2030-2035 sort of targets that they've had within climate. So I think part of this is is a way of of having uh a hybrid model, so you're much more secure and more reliable. But I think there's also a sort of a net zero commitment that's sort of embedded in there as well. Um that's sometimes I think people do uh mix up electrification and clean power generation. They're not the same, but because 80-90% of new renewal and renew power generating capacity coming on the is renewable, people kind of do confuse the two things. But obviously there's gas in there that that sort of is a bolt-on to that story. So I think it's more it's a hybrid solution I think that's emerging.

SPEAKER_01 38:04

Yeah, yeah, I mentioned uh small modular reactors, and I I had Justin Hume on the podcast recently from Uranium Insider. And Justin obviously is an expert in all areas of uranium and nuclear energy. And even it's a really fascinating area. Like you you you could talk, you could become a specialist in uranium, and you could spend the rest of your life looking at the the fuel cycle, the uranium fuel cycle, and how to potentially play that. Do you buy the spot price, do you buy the utilities, do you get the react invest in the reactors? What's what's your your kind of view uh on uranium and the the nuclear uh energy uh investment case in the context, I suppose, of the fundamental requirement for clean baseload energy as opposed to it intermittent with uh solar and wind.

SPEAKER_00 39:05

Well, nuclear is a really interesting nuclear is such an interesting topic because it's sort of a bit it it shows how ESG and sustainability is so um flawed, and all the definitions are so flawed because you know you have France on one side, this saying this is a sustainable fuel, and then Germany and places closing down nuclear. Um, and it just shows you how you know defence is another good example where we think these things are bad, but actually not when there's somebody with a gun against you. Do you think to actually spend on defence is very, very useful? Um so I think there's a sort of a there's been a sort of an investment issue in my world looking at nuclear like defense. You know, you know, even you know, even those companies that are selling us lots of sugary drinks and uh high fat products, are we gonna, you know, we're all looking out for the sort of the what what what does no significant harm type of concept. I think so, but going back to sort of uranium, I have to say it's it's I've found it when I was in commodities, it's quite a difficult um investment play. I mean, I would say um uh I I think the one of the one of the things with with nuclear projects is that just the timeline, the project line is so incredibly long, and there's natural development risk around that. But I think the the positive story is that more and more sort of countries around the world are looking at nuclear as a as as one of um as as an important integral part of the solution to that kind of energy transition course. So I don't really have any investment opportunities for you, but I think it is has become uh one of the the kind of the critical solutions towards the energy transition, um, which I think is a is a welcome thing.

SPEAKER_01 40:52

Yeah, I I I actually was watching the there's a good documentary on Netflix for people listening, uh Three Mile Island Meltdown. Um went back to the the accident there in the late 70s. But I think, and I mean uh the likes of Justin Hume and the rest of the uranium market will say were they're one accident away from wipeout essentially and uh a winter for ten years. Uh pardon the terrible pun there. But um in relation to if we zone in a bit closer then we've looked at the the the minerals, we've looked at the infrastructure, we've looked at the geopolitical situation, maybe looking at uh closer at Germany then and Europe uh more broadly, Michael, in terms of the investment uh situation, so Germany's venture capital investment is stuck around 0.2% of GDP, and that is minuscule when you would compare it with the likes of the US and the UK, and Germany would be the poster child of Europe, I suppose, uh from an investment perspective. But they're losing they're losing unicorns, they're losing these uh these uh startup companies. What does Europe and more Germany more particularly Europe need to do, I suppose, to foster that investment uh uh culture?

SPEAKER_00 42:14

So this is really important because I mean I think it was the end of 2022. Didow is we in research we published a paper looking at the structural problems that Europe faced and why was Europe, you know, its equities underperforming the US, and uh and the paper we published the paper, and our kind of bored went, this is a very depressing paper. Can you actually provide us with the solutions as to how do we fix these problems of industrial competitiveness, you know, the energy dependencies, um, the critical supply chain problems that we have as a continent? And so we embarked on what was called European transformation, looking at sector transformation, looking at ways at which critical technologies can actually solve for a lot of these issues that Europe faces, um, whether it's related to defense tech, clean tech, advanced manufacturing and robotics, um, cybersecurity, AI and semiconductors, looking at all of these ways that can really look at the national security, energy security, climate neutrality, industrial competitiveness, reducing strategic dependencies. So, you what Europe has done over the last few years is really embarked on quite an aggressive program. And I think people are probably naturally a little bit impatient, but this program has started. We have very aggressive targets for 2030 to meet as it relates to sort of climate ambition and sort of uh strategic technologies and uh uh circular economy, um transportation in terms of the electric vehicle fleet. So I think I'm sort of I'm I'm sort of optimistic. I think there's naturally a bit of a glass half empty when it comes to sort of European policy, but I think that the the transformation, particularly in Germany, and Germany um has set a kind of a new fiscal and re regulatory reset uh. And particularly as it relates to fiscal policy, taking out debt breaks, taking out defence, so it allows a much more aggressive defence spending program to emerge. Normally Germany was always in the shadow of the big spenders like UK and France, and now it's become a defence leader. So I think there are quite a lot of initiatives now. You were mentioning venture capital. This is a big issue and a big problem for Europe. And so there are initiatives at a European level in terms of EU start-up and scale-up strategy within Germany. Particularly, there is really an effort or an initiative to rebuild and reinvent the Mittelstand, which obviously was the great success story of the 50s and the 60s and post-war period. And now it is really to sort of refresh that. And there are a number of sort of initiatives out there to try and crowd in private sector investment. I mean, the numbers are still pretty small when you compare to the United States, and but Europe is understanding that it doesn't want to be kind of a startup feeder system for the for the sort of the US and Asia. They need these kind of unicorns, as you say, to stay within the continent. So there are efforts afoot to try and um uh to stop that that exodus. Um, and I think you know, we've seen it with big infrastructure spending commitments, you know, that this win initiative, all of these things are really trying to make for a much more uh positive financing environment that speeds up that sort of transformation story. And for us, Jeremy is at the heart of that sort of uh reinvention and transformation.

SPEAKER_01 45:39

So, in terms of the this emerging uh critical technology ecosystem in Germany, if I can uh if I can pin you a bit on on do where do you see uh some of the more stronger investment teams, if not uh opportunities, uh where where capital is flowing there?

SPEAKER_00 45:59

Yeah, well, I think probably the most the most dramatic one which has changed quite a lot is obviously defense. As I say, this is you know, we've got NATO targets, we need to be much more aggressively spending on defence. And so we've seen a number of deal flows, for example, looking at the German defence um sector, um, where a very high proportion of of of that was was uh of deal flow was going into Germany. Um I think when we look at sort of European venture capital in total, defense used to be about 1% a few years ago of European VC. Now it's 10%. So it's kind of increased about tenfold. So I think this is this is kind of uh uh uh one of the one of the big sectors, I think, um defense and aerospace that we're that we're sort of uh focusing on in terms of strategic technologies. Um but I think you know we also have it, there are quite a number of sort of various different um uh innovation hubs that you know across the country, um, which is looking at biotech and fintech. Um Munich wants to be kind of like the center of AI. So there's quite a lot of ambition here. But I think in terms of money uh that we've seen, in terms of deal flow, I would probably say defense has been probably uh the the biggest marginal change over the last couple of years. But we can also look at sort of clean tech as well, and Germany is pretty much dominant in terms of that um solar and wind kind of technology as well. So I think there there are quite kind of multiple avenues that have that are opening up here.

SPEAKER_01 47:34

Yeah, no, it's it's very interesting, Michael. I suppose as as we draw to to a close, um in terms of from a portfolio perspective, if if you're an investor, and I'm obviously not looking for individual names or even teams, but you're you're you're looking at these structural secular trends, energy transition, uh geopolitical fragmentation, uh increased nationalism competition, and you're thinking about how can I get exposure to these, which may be volatile, will be volatile in the short term, but inevitably will you know go from left to right and increase over time. Like if you were to kind of prioritize in your mind what are the top uh teams that you would look at there, what what what what would you say if that's a fair question?

SPEAKER_00 48:29

Yeah, well I would I would um I would identify electrification, and the reason why I would do this as the kind of the big mega trend is that there are really strong ambitions to increase electrification's role within the global economy. So you'll probably see at the end of this year, you know, the climate summits that happen um every year. Um the the next one I think is in Turkey, um, they will have a commitment to have electricity reaching 35% of total energy demand or final demand by 2035. So we're roughly at 20 to 25%. So there is like policy. So it's always good to be on the side of policy because that's going to push you in the direction. And we've got a lot of technology, and it's like, okay, well, how we've got that theme, how do we kind of play that in an investment process? And I guess we just draw on what we were sort of mentioning earlier. We we look at investment products that are trying to capture those critical materials. But if you if you're thinking to yourself, oh God, well, these these commodities are sort of 20, 30, 40% volatility, I might be a little bit that might be a little bit too much for me. You could then go into another part of the space, which would what we would call sort of passive X-Tracker type products, which are sort of index quite structured, formulaic weighting of companies that we view are going to be at the forefront of electrification technologies. And these these products, that's say the X-Trackers Electrification Exchange Rated Fund, will look at patents. So they're like this, we think that's a really good proxy of who's got the patents, who are going to be the kind of the leaders in that electrification story. So that could be another way of doing it. That can maybe the biggest pie is what we would call um next generation infrastructure. So you play that bit of the energy, so you've got not so much the commodities, not so much the the sort of uh um the patent story. It's looking at that infrastructure of grids and cables and all those sort of supply-side bottlenecks. We would so I would say electrification is kind of a big investment theme for us, and I think it kind of captures quite a large part of um uh, you know, quite a large part of, you know, we've got transport in there, we've got digital and data centers, we've got um buildings as well, um uh and uh and and the industrial sector which is electrifying. So I think it does capture quite a broad range of all sectors in the economy.

SPEAKER_01 50:57

Uh Michael, this has been absolutely fascinating. Uh I think uh a real masterclass in terms of uh energy transition, a number of themes, energy security, um, infrastructure, electrification. And I'd like to just finish, if you don't mind. Um there's there'll be the purpose, I suppose, of this podcast, it's called the most important thing. And it's designed to be evergreen in nature. So we talked to we just talked to experts and we asked them what their most important thing is in the context of bigger secular kind of trends. If having traversed all those areas, can I ask you what your most important thing is in the context of halfway through uh 2026?

SPEAKER_00 51:47

Um Well, the most important thing for me is I mean, I think we mentioned it earlier, our world has changed. Governments didn't used to interfere so much. They interfered, well, interfere, maybe that's the wrong word, but um, I would say that we live in a world which is so much more volatile than it was. When I was sort of in starting out, it was all about the rising peace dividend and the exploration of emerging markets and risk was going down. Um, I think we're in a world that is the complete opposite to that. And so understanding uh the vulnerability from an investment perspective of geopolitical risk, because I think uh that's one geopolitical risk, I think, is one because I think people just think it it's they're one-offs, but these are not one-offs, they're happening every single year, if not twice or three times a year. Um, and I think the other thing that we don't spend enough time on is physical climate risk. Um, we've obviously seen what's going on in Europe with the heat, um, but these things I think we don't have really enough data to understand extreme weather events and their impact on our on listed equity portfolio, for example. We did a paper back and work with a data provider back in 2017, and it was so interesting looking at floods in Thailand or typhoons in Korea, how this affects supply chains, how this impacts portfolios and companies in Japan, the United States, Europe from a weather event that was going on in Thailand. You were just thinking, why on earth? What's happening here? Um hurricanes in Puerto Rico infecting pharmaceutical supply chains in the United States. It's just like, and I don't think since 2017 we've got any better in terms of operational assets on the ground and overlaying with climate models. And if we have got better, it's become too complicated. And as an investor, we find it really complicated to actually integrate it in. So I'd say the most important thing is for us to understand physical climate risk, resilience, and adaptation much more than we do at present because it's kind of we spend so much time on energy transition, we forget about the thing that's kind of banging at our door every morning when we wake up and read the weather news.

unknown 53:53

Great.

SPEAKER_01 53:53

There'd be an awful lot of people that have taken an awful lot from this uh interview, Michael. If people are want to learn more about what you do or follow you, are you active on social media or not? Or are you surely have a book coming somewhere with all those decades of experience?

SPEAKER_00 54:10

Well, maybe. There is somebody else with my name who writes very good books. Um I would say, yes, we do have our own publicly available website, and you might sometimes see me on social media and LinkedIn and places like that.

SPEAKER_01 54:24

I'm sure many people will be following up on that. Uh listen, Michael, I want to say a huge thank you. I really appreciate it and really enjoyed this. It's been fantastic both prepping for this and actually doing it. So sincere thanks, you've been very generous with your time. Thanks, Michael.

SPEAKER_00 54:39

Thank you very much. Thank you very much for inviting me.

SPEAKER_01 54:42

But what should we take away from that conversation with Michael Lewis? For me, the biggest point is that the energy transition has entered a very different phase. This is no longer simply a story about replacing fossil fuels with renewables. It is increasingly a story about energy security, industrial capacity, geopolitics, and ultimately who controls the infrastructure and raw materials that power the modern economy. Michael made clear that electrification is colliding with the physical constraints of the real world. We can build more solar and wind, we can sell more electricity vehicles, we can construct enormous data centers, but all of those things ultimately need to connect to the same system. And that system, the grid, is becoming one of the defining bottlenecks of the next decade. Transformers, cables, transmission lines, interconnections, permitting, these aren't necessarily the glamorous parts of the energy transition, but increasingly they may be where the economics are decided. The same is true of critical minerals. Copper is a great example. Demand is being pulled simultaneously by grids, renewables, EVs, data centers, and industrial electrification, while bringing meaningful new supply online can take years. Lithium shows the other side of commodity investing. Even when the long-term demand story is compelling, supply can respond aggressively and prices can be extraordinarily volatile. And then there are rare arts where China's dominance of processing and refining demonstrates something even bigger. Control of the supply chain can become geopolitical leverage. That's why governments are becoming increasingly interventionist. Strategic minerals, energy infrastructure, and manufacturing capacity are no longer being treated purely as markets. They're being treated as matters of national security. And underneath all of this sits another extraordinary source of demand. You guessed it? Artificial intelligence. The AI boom is also an electricity boom. Hyperscalers are increasingly thinking not simply about where they can build data centers, but where they can actually secure reliable power. And when grid capacity isn't available, the conversation moves towards on-site generation, storage, and increasingly nuclear power. Which brings us perfectly to our fourth and final conversation. Because if Michael Lewis helped us understand the enormous electricity challenges ahead, Justin Hune in part two helps us examine one of the technologies being asked to solve it. And commodities sitting at the center of that story is uranium. As we saw in part two, Justin is the founder and publisher of Uranium Insider, and his thesis starts with a remarkably simple equation. Look at the uranium requirements of the world's nuclear fleet, then look at supply available to beat them. In his view, the resulting structural imbalance is the core of the uranium investment case. But our conversation goes beyond uranium prices. We explore why nuclear power has returned to the center of the energy debate, how AI and data centers are changing electricity demand, why utilities, governments, and technology companies are thinking differently about energy security, and why uranium supply cannot simply be switched on when demand rises. Those teams are increasingly central to Hume's analysis of the nuclear market. And that creates a fascinating connection between these conversations. If the first phase of the energy transition was about generating cleaner electricity, the next phase may be about something much harder, producing enough reliable electricity, getting it to the right place, and securing the materials and fuel required to do it. That is where climate policy meets AI, commodities, infrastructure, and national security. And it's where we turn next. Check out the second part of my conversation with Justin Hume next week. Really hope that you're enjoying the energy series. Please reach out to us if you want to provide feedback. There's a dedicated website, the MITpodcast.com, open to suggestions on guests and how we can make the show better. If you are getting value, we really would appreciate a review or a star rating on Spotify and our Apple. It really does help us secure the top guests and promote the show. Until next time, thank you.